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This paper conducts an event-study analysis to investigate the relationship between un- 
conventional monetary policy announcements by the ECB and corresponding stock returns in 
the EMU, furthermore, it also postulates a second hypothesis to ascertain whether this 
relationship differs for firms listed amongst exchanges in Northern region of the EU name 
Germany, France and The Netherlands with their Southern Counterparts in the EMU, namely 
Italy, Portugal and Spain between 2006 and 2015. 10-year Government bond yields for Italy 
and Germany are used to calculate the surprise coefficient, while the returns are calculated from 
the return’s indices of the firms on the CAC, PSI, IBEX, DAX, AEX, and MIB30. The 
significance of the variations of the Returns are tested with Wilcoxon and GRANK tests (Non- 
Parametric) for AARs and CAARs respectively. The results suggest that there is a relationship 
between an unconventional monetary policy announcement and stock returns. The results also 
indicate that this relationship differs for Northern and Southern European firms. The Average 
Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) indicate 
opposite movement of stock returns in most cases. Finally, an event study analysis is also 
conducted on 6 portfolios of Europe wide firms segregated through an intersection of firm size 
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Author: Arya Datta 





Este artigo conduz uma análise de estudo de evento para investigar a relação entre anúncios de 
política monetária não convencionais do BCE e retornos de ações correspondentes na UEM. 
Além disso, postula uma segunda hipótese para verificar se essa relação difere para as empresas 
listadas nas bolsas de valores. Região norte do nome da UE Alemanha, França e Países Baixos, 
com suas contrapartes do sul na UEM, nomeadamente Itália, Portugal e Espanha entre 2006 e 
2015. Os rendimentos dos títulos do governo a 10 anos para Itália e Alemanha são usados para 
calcular o coeficiente de surpresa, enquanto os retornos são calculados a partir dos índices de 
retorno das empresas no CAC, PSI, IBEX, DAX, AEX e MIB30. A significância das variações 
dos retornos é testada com os testes Wilcoxon e GRANK (não paramétricos) para AARs e 
CAARs, respectivamente. Os resultados sugerem que existe uma relação entre um anúncio de 
política monetária não convencional e o retorno das ações. Os resultados também indicam que 
esse relacionamento difere para as empresas do Norte e do sul da Europa. Os retornos anormais 
médios (AARs) e os retornos anormais médios cumulativos (CAARs) indicam um movimento 
oposto dos retornos das ações na maioria dos casos. Por fim, também é realizada uma análise 
de estudo de eventos em 6 carteiras de empresas na Europa, segregadas por uma interseção 
entre tamanho da empresa e capitalização de mercado, cujos resultados não mostram evidências 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In May 2017, Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank received severe 
criticism in the Dutch Parliament for his monetary policies, which were allegedly 
responsible for, besides other factors, plummeting the savings of Dutch residents (Jonker, 
2017). By applying such policies, the ECB not only affected the macro-economic 
environment, but also the financial environment as financial Intermediaries and other 
crucial members of the capital markets are highly responsive to changes in monetary 
policies. It comes as no surprise that the relationship between capital markets and monetary 
policies have been a topic of investigation since over a decade, amongst many scholars 
(Thorbecke, 1997, Patelis, 1997, Wang et al., 2015). Notwithstanding, areas of research 
with respect to the relationship between an unconventional monetary policy and the 
financial markets, especially stock returns, are under development. Over the course of the 
decade, the ECB has introduced a variety of UMPs to pull Europe out of their sovereign 
debt crisis, which had caused immense economic damage to several sub economies with the 
greater euro area. However, the agendas eventually shifted towards rectifying plummeting 
growth prospects and a consistently diminishing level of inflation. Ample research has been 
conducted over the past decade determining the effect of unconventional monetary policies 
(UMPs) on domestic markets and potential spill overs to global markets, of which opinions 
regarding UMPs vary significantly. Rogers et al, (2014) states that the euro had appreciated 
after the initial package of UMPs, while Georgiadis and Gräb (2015) contradict this 
statement, asserting that the Expanded Asset Purchase (EAP) Programme announced on 22 
January 2015, in fact depreciated the Euro momentarily. Furthermore, due to these policies, 
that had as collateral effect the reduction of yields of the weaker economies within the 
union, many believe that the current yields of these countries undermine the country risk 
premium thereby not reflecting the true risk a country might pose with respect to future 
growth. Amidst this magnitude of pressure, it is of utmost concern to the ECB to ensure that 
they maintain their credibility as policy makers, with continuous efforts to pull inflation 
rates in a fairly recessive economic landscape. As we shall discuss the primary purpose of 
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this dissertation in the following paragraph, highlighting the expectations of banks the 
capital markets as a whole on the announcement of UMPs might create friction in the 
movements of such markets. Subsequently, in an environment of populist leadership, 
concise honest reflections of the EU economic health would only correct the mismatched 
dynamics of asset pricing.  This thesis studies the implications of the monetary policy 
surprises of the European Central Bank and aims to infer the consequent effect of such 
activity on European stock markets. The stock markets will reflect both the investing 
sentiment of the citizens of Europe in terms of the volume of trade and the liquidity of 
funds available, which have a link to the supply of money that is being affected by such 
policies. The idea of this study is to see whether the plethora of monetary policies have an 
effect on economically stronger countries differently than economically weaker countries, 
and if so. Whether it is difficult to create monetary policies that affect all the sub economies 
in the union in a homogeneously beneficial way or whether the Economic vision of the 
European Union has a long way to go before it reaches complete economic stability and 
finally, if the it was all a big mistake. 
This dissertation serves the purpose in making contribution to the literature by exploring the 
relationship between unconventional monetary policy as announced by the ECB and its effect 
thereof on stock returns in the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (Euro area). It will 
additionally contribute to this research by examining whether an unconventional monetary 
policy announcement is different in terms of the impact that it has on Southern and Northern 
European firms. The methodology used in the paper is that of an event study. The results 
indicate that an unconventional monetary policy surprise announcement has a mixed effect 
on European stock markets. In addition, the results also offer evidence about the Southern 
European stock markets/firms responding in a manner that is different from the ones in 
Northern Europe. The unconventional monetary policy announcements have a strikingly 
positive influence on the southern EMU stock markets (Portugal, Spain, Italy), 
The first section throws light upon the conceptual backdrop and literature review, the second 
examines the data and methodology, the third section describes the results, and the last section 
postulates the conclusion.
 3  
2. Literature Review  
 
In this section the pertinent literature and theory will be discussed, consequently there are 
two hypotheses that will be formulated. 
Unconventional monetary policy measures have been segregated into two distinct sides, that 
of quantitative easing and credit easing1 both of which bring about a change in the balance 
sheet of the central bank. However, many strive to find a suitable definition to summarise 
such policies, as is claimed that unconventional monetary policies are explained more by 
what it is not rather than what it is (Joyce et al. 2012). For the purpose of this paper, the 
unconventional monetary policies identified by Haitsma et al. (2016)1 have been used (Table 
2). It has been argued by Joyce et al. (2012) that prior to and at the brink of the global financial 
crisis (GFC), monetary policy in major economies had a clear goal, viz. attaining a low and 
stable inflation by setting the interest rates as per the Taylor- rules. An instance of 
conventional policy used for overcoming a rapidly growing economy is that the central banks 
elevate the policy interest rates so as to limit asset price increases, stimulate savings and 
contain expenditure. However, banks have misused periods of low interest rates by taking on 
riskier investments (sub-prime lending) and companies have used the inflated value of their 
long term assets to obtain short term finances causing price instability for the future, The 
global financial crisis of 2008 is a good example of the above, wherein banks were defaulting 
and the government could neither restrict banks from increasing cash reserves nor bailout 
every distressed bank, at a time when interest rates lowered to zero and people were no longer 
incentivized to pick up new money into the economy. Such aforementioned limitations of 
conventional monetary policy were cited throughout the crisis and the need for new 
mechanisms was surging. Thus, the introduction of unorthodox policy measures for 
overcoming these problems, got coined as unconventional policies. The need for alternate 
tools for controlling mechanisms of asset pricing had arisen because their policy rates had 
plummeted to a record low known as the effective lower bound (ELB). Drawing from 
 
1 See data section for further information 
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Smaghi’s (2009) speech, a common example of an unconventional monetary policy is direct 
quantitative easing (QE), which essentially postulates that the central bank expands its 
balance sheet by purchasing financial assets. Often direct QE focuses on buying long-term 
government bonds anticipating that, along with bond yields, yields on privately issued 
securities decline and that long-term interest rates drop. The dropping rates in turn will 
stimulate long-term investments as well as aggregate demand. Amidst the conceptualization 
and rolling out of such unconventional monetary policy events, it had always been the 
intention of such measures to be temporary and a one-off introduction in the economy to limit 
financial stress and ensure price stability during extraordinary market conditions. However, 
the departure from these policies has still not been realized. Through temporary terminations 
and additions in new characteristics to these measures, one can question whether the effect 
of these unorthodox measures has been truly harmonious to the European Economy as a 
whole.  
 
Primary Programs Launched Under ECBs Unconventional Monetary Policy. 
1) Securities Markets Program (SMP): The Securities Markets Program was announced by 
the ECBs Governing council in May 2010. The SMP is the process of purchasing debt 
securities from specific sovereign issuers by the Euro system from its European counterparts. 
Unlike the Asset Purchase Program (APP), the purpose SMP was not of pushing in money 
supply into weaker European economies like Greece but in fact, it was a precursor to the QE 
programs. The idea was to help these distressed economies by ensuring depth and liquidity 
in these market segments that were not functioning properly. At a time when the ECB had 
plummeted rates to a record low, the government bonds of crisis-struck economies were being 
traded at 200 – 300 BPS above average yields at 4%, when Italian 10-year bonds rose to 
6.63% in November 2011. 
2) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT): The ECBs Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) or bond buying program was announced by Mario Draghi in September 2012. The 
Primary purpose of this program was for the ECB to buy short-term Government bonds of 
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countries within the Eurozone that were being speculated to leave the Euro. As a result of this 
speculation, interest rates on these bonds had shot up, and the ECB wanted to help stabilize 
this mismatch of risk that they believed was unfairly reflected in the yields demanded by the 
market on the short-term government securities of these countries. The famous ‘Whatever it 
takes speech’ by Mario Draghi was a prelude to the OMT program. The program was never 
activated. 
3) Asset Purchase Program (APP): The APP launched by the ECB in mid-2014 was amongst 
the most popular unconventional monetary policy measure. Aimed at ensure price stability, 
the ECB bought an assortment of assets ranging from sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, asset 
backed securities and covered bonds. The APP net purchases terminated at the end of year 
2018 but were resumed in November 2019. The different sub-programs launched under the 
APP (i) Corporate sector purchase program (CSPP), (ii) Public Sector Purchase Program 
(PSPP), (iii) Asset-backed securities purchase program (ABSPP), (iv) Third covered bond 
purchase program (CBPP3). 
4) Targeted longer-term refinancing Operations (TLTROs): TLTRO’s was a program 
launched around the same time as the APP. It consisted in the provision of financing to credit 
institutions, incentivizing credit lending into the real economy by providing a “premia” in 
case lending exceeded a predefined benchmark, thereby further strengthening monetary 
policy transmissions. There were three different series of TLTRO measures launched as 
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 Table 1, Important Announcement days 
 
One of the primary effects of unconventional monetary policy is concerned with how the 
valuation of a firm is conducted. As per Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2008), monetary policy 
affects the stock price by changing components in the discounted cash flow valuation model. 
As stated in the discounted cash flow model the stock prices are equal to the present value of 
the future cash flows of a firm. Changing the existing monetary policy can impact this present 
value in two ways: first, by altering the discount rate, and second, by having an effect on the 
expected value of the future cash flows. More so, as argued by Ioannidis and Kontonikas 
(2008) these two components are inter-related, as tightening monetary policy leads to a higher 
discount rate and lower cash flows as a result of lower future economic activity. An expansive 
monetary policy on the other hand entails a lower discount rate and higher economic activity. 
Interestingly the Asset Purchase Program launched by the ECB as mentioned in the above 
sub section, endorses its commitment to substantiating its mandate by actively using this 
ECB Monetary Policy Announcements  
Dates Event Program 
22-08-2007 Supplementary Long-term Refinancing Operations LTRO 
04-06-2009 Details Covered Bond Purchase Program CBPP 
03-12-2009 Amendments to Long-term Refinancing Operations LTRO 
04-03-2010 Amendments to Long-term Refinancing Operations LTRO 
10-05-2010 Securities Markets Program SMP 
04-08-2011 Securities Markets Program SMP 
06-10-2011 Second Covered Bond Purchase Program CBPP 
08-12-2011 New Long-term Refinancing Operations; Reduced Reserve Ratio; Increased Collateral  LTRO 
28-02-2012 Second Long-term Refinancing Operations Results LTRO 
26-07-2012 The 'London Whatever it takes' speech OMT 
02-08-2012 Outright Monetary Transactions OMT 
06-09-2012 Details Outright Monetary Transactions OMT 
22-03-2013 Amendments to Collateral Rules CSPP 
03-07-2014 Details Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations LTRO 
09-11-2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges purchasable universe PSPP 
05-10-2016 Changes to collateral eligibility criteria and risk control measures for unsecured bonds ABSPP 
15-12-2016 Euro system adjusts purchase process in ABS purchase programme (ABSPP) ABSPP 
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measure to address the risks of a low inflation time period thereby reassuring investors a 
stable inflation rate over the medium – to – long term, of roughly 2%. 
An important effect of unconventional monetary policy, which could change stock prices, is 
a signaling effect. This effect can be separately studied in two sub signaling effects.  One 
occurs after the central bank announces about a specific monetary policy. An example here 
would be, as per Rogers et al. (2014), the central bank signaling that they will expand asset 
acquisitions and other programs to drive term premia and risk premia down, after a LSAP 
(large scale asset purchases) is announced. In addition, it has been argued that a credible 
signal by itself is enough to drive these yields down because agents anticipate the effects of 
the purchases. The other effect results from an information asymmetry problem, namely that 
the central bank having more information about the current and future state of the economy 
than investors. For example, Haitsma et al. (2016) suggest that in times of a crisis a lowering 
of the policy rate may signal to investors that future economic conditions are worse than 
expected. By combining the two signaling effects in his so-called news effect, Bomfim (2003) 
states that announcements may uncover new information not previously assimilated into asset 
prices. 
In addition, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) suggest that the signaling effect is 
a way that QE could influence financial markets.  In fact, they propose that signaling is only 
one of the channels in which QE could affect the financial market. Taken all together there 
are roughly seven different channels that have been established, viz. the signaling, interest 
rate, duration risk, liquidity, safety, prepayment risk premium, and default risk channel. The 
signaling and valuation effect of unconventional monetary policy on stock prices leads to the 
first hypothesis which postulates that an announcement with respect to unconventional 
monetary policy has an effect on stock prices. Although, whether the effect is positive or 
negative is not known as the policy can be either tightening or expanding. If the ECBs asset 
purchases pushes down rates, one could expect stock prices to rise, however, these 
announcements could also lead investors to think that the government is taking measures to 
stabilize government bond yields, thus attracting the attention of investors to safer assets like 
treasuries, causing a shift of capital from riskier equity markets to safer treasury instruments. 
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An ECB announcement to purchase assets also indicate a positive future outlook for the 
country that will lower future expected long-term rates, attracting investors to push more 
money into equity capital markets. 
To formulate our first hypothesis, in relation to the events selected, one can notice from Table 
2, that the first (10-05-2010) and third (26-07-2012) events reduced intra euro spreads, 
indicating a loosening nature of rates, while the second (04-08-2011) event tightens rates 
within the euro area. On 10-05-2010, Italian 10-year yield fell from 4.3% to 3.9% while 
German 10-year yield rose from 2.7% to 3% similarly on 26-07-2012, Italian 10-year yield 
fell from 6% to 5.8% while German 10-year yield rose from 1.3% to 1.4%. However, on 04-
08-2011, in contrary to the aforementioned events, Italian 10-year yield rose from 6.09% to 
6.3% and German 10-year yield fell from 2.3% to 2%. The change in yields witnessed on the 
event dates are an indication of the loosening or tightening nature of policies, for the ones 
reducing intra euro spreads we expect a positive effect on European stock markets, with an 
expectation of increased inflation and for the event further widening the intra euro spreads 
we expect a negative effect on stock markets thereby, postulating our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An expansionary unconventional monetary policy announcement has a positive 
signaling effect on stock prices. 
 
The second hypothesis emerges from the fact that there is a common monetary policy in the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), while there is heterogeneity the several 
countries within the EMU. In addition, Rogers et al. (2014) contend that the ECB policies 
aim at reducing market fragmentation in the euro area, in particular tightening intra-Eurozone 
spreads and that monetary policy would have varying effects between Eurozone countries. 
This is because of the fact that the same monetary policy is operating for countries/regions 
that are different. These differences are in, amongst others, financial and macro-economic 
conditions. Thus, the second hypothesis postulates that the effects of an unconventional 
monetary policy announcement lead to different effects on stock prices across the euro area. 
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I will group into two regions that share some similarity, namely North Europe and South 
Europe. 
 
Hypothesis 2: an unconventional monetary policy announcement results in a negative effect 





This section initiates a descriptive discussion about the data used and its relevant treatments 
and transformation and, subsequently, discusses the research methodology. 
The data used in this paper can be ascertained into primarily, two groups; unconventional 
monetary policy announcements and return indices sets. 
The unconventional monetary policy data points are sourced from the paper Haitsma et al. 
(2016), thereby distinguishing the announcements between conventional and unconventional 
monetary policies. Obtaining all data from the aforementioned paper and the official website 
of the ECB2 results in a list of nineteen policy announcements (Table 1). However, as 
mentioned by Rogers et al. (2014) certain monetary policy announcements had been 
anticipated by market participants prior to their official announcement, and do not make up 
for the data used in our event study analysis and is therefore, omitted. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, equity markets that are efficient, must reflect 
all expected policy changes in their stock prices efficiently. Thus, it is inferred that only 
unexpected policy announcements shall affect stock prices. This paper follows the approach 
suggested by Rogers et al. (2014) to calculate a surprise coefficient for measuring the 
magnitude of discrepancies in prices during a monetary policy announcement. It is built on 
 
2 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/html/index.en.html 
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the concept that the ECB aims to narrow intra euro spreads. Therefore, if there is a change in 
the spreads on the day of a policy announcement, either increasing or decreasing, one could 
infer that the policy was respectively tighter or looser than expected.  The following formula 
established in the paper Haitsma et al. (2016) has been used to find a surprise coefficient3, 
which is a proxy established to calculate the change in daily spreads using ten year Germany 
and Italian Government bond yields, basing it on the implicit objective to tighten intra-euro 
spreads. The surprise coefficient, thus, is measured as the daily change in the spread between 
Italian and German yields, i.e.: 
 
                             Δytu, c =   (y Is.t   - y Gs.t  ) – ( y Is.t-1   -  y Gs.t-1 )                          (1)   
 
Where y Is.t and y Gs.t are the Italian and German ten-year government bond yields at day t. 
Rogers et al. (2014) state that, from a general perspective the magnitude of change in the 
bond yields after a policy announcement, reveals how well the market participants expected 
this announcement. Debating the fact that EMU countries could react differently on monetary 
policies, e.g. Rogers et al. (2014) explain that “actions that succeed in lowering sovereign 
spreads tended to drive German yields up”, alternatively drive Italians yield down. A formula 
consisting of more than one yield is necessary to ascertain the surprise coefficient for the 
Eurozone. Our methodology suggests that most unconventional monetary policy 
announcements are almost entirely anticipated by the financial market. Therefore, all policy 





3 See appendix A, table 1 for surprise coefficients 
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As a result, three policy announcements remain. Table 2 presents the relevant information 
         
Table 2, Selected Event Dates 
Date Surprise Coefficient Short Description 
10-05-2010 -50% Securities market program 
04-08-2011  19% Long-term refinancing program. 
26-07-2012 -43% The ’London whatever it takes’ speech 
 
 
The sign of the surprise Coefficient determines the loosening or tightening nature of the 
policy announcements, such that a negative surprise coefficient indicates the loosening nature 
of rates as intra euro spreads narrow down, while positive surprise coefficients depict 
tightening policy announcements as the spread widens.  
 
The second cluster of data contains the continuous returns of the firms used to measure the 
response of an unconventional monetary policy announcement. The dataset used for the 
analysis consists of the total return indices between 2006 and 2017 for firms listed on a select 
set of equity Indices, which include: CAC, IBEX, DAX, AEX, and MIB30, and the Eurostoxx 
50 total return index. This is done keeping in mind to take a proxy of the economy to bifurcate 
the Northern part of the Core EU and its southern counterpart. The raw data has been sourced 
from DataStream. Certain firms with missing observations, either due to removal from 
indexes or late IPOs or bankruptcy’s amongst other reasons have not been included, 
consequently, 138 firms remain. Subsequently, Daily returns are calculated from the total 
return indices through the following formula.  
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                                                 rt =           (2) 
 
Wherein, rt represents the percentage return while TRt shows the total return index, both at 
day t respectively. The returns are categorised into three sets, (i) demonstrating the entire 
EMU, including observations from the Indices representative of France, Spain, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands, and its relevant composite (ii) representing the Northern EMU, 
including observations from Netherlands and Germany, and, finally, (iii) representing the 
Southern EMU, with observations from Portugal, Italy and Spain. In conclusion to this 
section, there are four possible unconventional monetary policy announcements post sample 
correction in line with primary literature along with three samples of European stock returns 
categorised under geographical borders. Appendix A presents tables (2-10) with descriptive 
statistics for the stock returns. Finally, a third dataset containing 6 portfolios segregated on 
the basis of market capitalisation and investment is used to analyse whether the events have 
an effect on securities subject to its size. The data has been sourced from the Kenneth French 
database. Each portfolio consists of European exchange listed companies that fall under 









1  TRt-1 
* 100 
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4. Research Methodology 
 
The paper conducts an event study methodology in order to analyse the signalling effect of 
monetary policy announcement shocks on stock markets.  
The format of an event study analysis has been a preferred technique in research with respect 
to the relationships between monetary policies and capital markets for over several decades, 
among others by Thorbecke (1997), Prabu et al. (2016), and Ricci (2015). In a midst of the 
several methodologies established, many have analysed the effect of Monetary policy shocks 
on cumulative abnormal returns as a whole with corresponding estimation windows, while 
others have employed an impulse response analysis to measure coefficients by using a 
dummy variable of ‘1’ on the day of such unconventional monetary policy announcements. 
Papers have used the event study method in isolation or in amalgamation with other methods 
in a way different from each other and/or in different kinds of research, largely these research 
papers have used the market model to calculate expected returns.  
 
4.1 Calculating Abnormal Returns 
 
The estimation of expected returns can be carried out through more than one way. The two 
popular methods that are applied is the historical mean model (HMM) and the CAPM or 
single index model (SIM). 
 
                                                 E(r (i,t)) = μi                                                        (3) 
                                           E(r (i,t)) = αi + βi R(m,t)                                                                         (4) 
 
With respect to the former (see Eq. 3), the mean of an assets historical return over the selected 
estimation window represents the expected return (unconditioned to the event). Conversely, 
the latter represents the CAPM or the single index model (see Eq. 4), where the expected 
 14  
return depends on the parameters αi and βi (explained in the next paragraph) estimated over 
the estimation windows, and the market return R (m,t). A special case of this model is the 
market adjusted model (MAM), wherein a constraint (0 and 1) is set on the estimated 
parameters αi and βi respectively, to return a purer effect of the market. Furthermore, to 
improve the observations in quantifying the variation of the error term which is the abnormal 
return (AR) in our case of an event study, scholars have used the 3 factor Fama-French model 
(1993) in order to better estimate the deviations. Consequently, this paper, in line with popular 
literature, will use the market model.  The market model calculates the relation between the 
expected return of an individual security and that of the market using the above formula (see 
Eq. 4),  where αi is the ‘alpha’ of a security that is the abnormal return unexplainable by the 
market while the βi is the return explained by the market return as a whole, both which are 
estimated parameters, E(ri) is the expected return and rm is the market return, both at day t. 
Once expected returns are computed, the paper proceeds to obtain abnormal returns (ARs). 
However, ARs are used when computing the impact of an event/s on a security for a single 
day. Since the paper aims to observe the effect on a combination of days as mentioned above 
while determining the event window, hence calculating a time series aggregation. The ARs 
and CARs are obtained by the following formulae as described by equations (5) & (6). 
 
                                        
                                              ARi,t = R(i,t) - E(r (i,t))                                            (5) 
                                            CARi (t1, t2) = Σ
t
t=t-1
AR (i,t)                                                            (6) 
 
The next element to the analysis builds on the previous section pertaining to the nature of our 
data. When dealing with panel data like the one present in our paper, both time series and 
cross-sectional data have to be accurately reflected in our analysis. The aforementioned 
equations (5) and (6) take care of the time series nature of our observations. However, since 
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we are also dealing with a pool of firms here, on a bottom – top approach the results need to 
reflect an aggregation of the time series on the chosen datasets, thus consolidating the results 
into Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, which are 
obtained by the following formulae. 
 
                                     AARt = 1/N (Σ
N 
  i=1 AR (i,t) )                                          (7) 
                                      CAAR (t1, t2) =   Σ
T
t=t1
 AARt                                                                   (8)                                                                                                      
 
Where AR (i,t) represents the abnormal return estimated on the i-th security and N the 
securities’ population. In the words of Kothari and Warner (2008), the cross-sectional 
aggregation of abnormal returns makes sense if one aims either at studying if the event alters, 
on average, the security holders’ wealth, or at testing economic models and alternative 
hypotheses suggesting the sign of the mean impact.  
Consistent with Haitsma et al. (2016), the Eurostoxx 50 index has been used as a proxy for 
the market to estimate the market return. The estimation window used for this analysis is set 
at twelve, three and one month, while the event window makes use of several combinations 
at three days with the event dates in the middle (t-1, t, t+1). The lengths selected for the 
estimation and event window are comparable with the estimation window of Haitsma et al. 
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4.2 Statistical Characteristics of Abnormal Returns 
 
Testing for the statistical significance to provide a robustness to the results obtained through 
our analysis is not as straightforward. As per statistical principle it is mandatory to test for 
the variance calculated in the event study, thereby, verifying if the square of the Abnormal 
Returns (AR2) is significantly different from zero.  
The literature researched offers two types of tests to ascertain the significance of the 
aforementioned variable (AR2). Namely, Parametric and Non-Parametric tests. Parametric 
tests essentially take the variance to be normally distributed while non-parametric tests are 
not linked to any strict form distribution. Amongst popular parametric tests like the T-test 
that are fairly straightforward to conduct, it might not be the most suitable option for verifying 
the significance for Abnormal Returns in our event study, since it assumes that the dataset 
possesses no cross-sectional correlation. In our case, the model certainly contains cross-
sectional correlation because the event dates are the same for all securities (Event clustering), 
hence, the model is biased. Moreover, attached to the ‘normality’ property assumption of the 
distribution, the tests may seriously underperform if the distributions are not normal. 
By relying on no specific distribution in the returns generated in our analysis, we use the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test that checks for the statistical significance of AARs solving the event 
clustering issue of the magnitude in the variance (ARs), while the generalized rank test 
(GRANK) outperforms the parametric ones without suffering either from the serial 
correlation of ARs or from the event-induced volatility in calculating the (CAARs). The 
GRANK test is, especially, useful as Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) specifically argue that the 
generalized rank t-test statistic is more robust, when event days are clustered. Therefore, the 
Wilcoxon test is used for estimating significance levels of the AARs (T-1, T0 & T+1) and 
CAAR3. 
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The Wilcoxon rank test can be regarded as an extension of the GSIGN test, since it 
considers both the sign and the magnitude of abnormal returns. This test assumes that none 
of the absolute values are equal and are non-zero.  
 
                                              Wt = Σ
N 
  i=1 rank (Ai,t)                                           (9) 
 
 
where rank (Ai,t) is the positive rank of the absolute value of abnormal returns Ai,t at time 
point t for firm i. The test statistic for testing (H0:AAR=0) is then defined as 
 
                                  zwilcoxon,t =       W−N(N−1)/4                                      (10) 
              (N(N+1)(2N+1)/12) 
 
In the case for testing the cumulative averaged abnormal return (H0:CAAR=0), we add the 
CAAR value for each firm i to the abnormal returns in the event window and do the same 
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5. Results  
 
This section will summarise and discuss the results obtained in order of the hypothesis. 
 
 
5.1 Hypothesis 1  
 
The first hypothesis strives to ascertain whether an unconventional monetary policy 
announcement has a positive signalling effect on stock returns, furthermore, if that effect is 
positive for the first and third event, since pushing more money into the economy and the 
loosening nature of the policies should surge financial and economic growth. Additionally, 
we expect a negative effect on stock markets for the second event, because intra-Euro spreads 
had widened on the event day (04-08-2011). The following Tables 3 and 4 exhibit the average 
abnormal returns (AARs) along with the 3-day cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR3) 
with an estimation window of three months and twelve months respectively, to verify if the 
hypothesis holds true. The tables show the AARs and CAARs of the event days, and shows 
whether the returns are significantly different from zero by using a Wilcoxon ranking test.  
As mentioned in the Data section of this paper, one amongst the 3 events had to be dropped 
for the 12-month analysis, since the event was lying within the estimation period of an event 
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Table 3, AARs and CAARs 3 month’s estimation window using Wilcoxon-ranking test. 































Significance at 10%*, at 5%** and at 1%*** 
 
 
Table 4, AARs and CAARs 12 month’s estimation window using Wilcoxon-ranking test. 





















Significance at 10%*, at 5%** and at 1%*** 
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It is evident from the aforementioned tables that the returns on the day of the event (T0) along 
with the day after the event (T1) are both different from zero, as the average abnormal returns 
for the corresponding dates are almost all significant at the 1% level. The three day 
Cumulative average abnormal returns are almost all significant at the 1% level as well. The 
day before the event date (T-1) indicates that they are not significantly different than zero 
with the exception of the event on 26/07/2012, which showed a significant surge in returns 
on the EU as a whole.  On the day of the event (T0) all AARs plummeted except one on the 
26-07-2012 at the 3 month estimation window. One thing we are certain about is that the 
tables are not biased on the basis of cross-sectional correlation due to event clustering, since 
we have used the Wilcoxon and GRANK tests to determine the significance in the variations 
of the abnormal returns. Consequently, there seems to be no explicitly intuitive pattern that 
is unambiguously observed from Tables 3 and 4. Despite these differences, the abnormal 
returns for the event date are still significantly different from zero, for the announcements on 
10-05-2010 and 04-08-2011 the returns were lower than the market expected and for 26-07-
2012 the returns were higher.  
In accordance with our expectation from the first hypothesis, two out of three results stand in 
line with our expectations. Event two shows a significant drop in the European stock markets 
with a 224 BPS surge in the Italian 10-year yield, causing the market to drop by -0.21%. 
Event three although showing a slight drop of -0.11% on T0 in the 3-month estimation 
window, turns upwards on the following day resulting in a net positive CAAR3, which is also 
in line with the expectations of this dissertation. In the 12-month estimation window all AARs 
for the third event 26-07-2012 are positive, conclusive with an upward movement in the 
German 10-year yield by 100 BPS, while Italian 10-year yields dropped by 300 BPS. Both 
of these events are indicative of a successful UMP announcement transmitted through the 
signalling channel into financial markets. However, the only counter intuitive result lies in 
the first event held on 10-05-2010, where a 352 BPS drop in Italian 10-year yield and a 200 
BPS surge in German 10-year yield did not influence the European stock market to surge on 
T0 but it picked up pace on the following day (T1), exhibiting a positive effect. It is important 
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to note that this was the first SMP program launched. It is also important to notice that on the 
day after the announcement T1, it was the event with the sharpest turn in markets from day 
T0 to T1, with a surge of 0.27%. Also as observed on a longer event horizon of 5 days, a 
CAAR5 shows a significant positive return in the stock markets thus falling in line with our 
expectations. However, no conclusive evidence is found for the drop in European stock 
markets on the announcement day of event 1. One reason for the event 1 to show negative 
returns is the fact that the euro area markets are largely skewed to the norther EMU firms 
with respect to the listing on the composite index (EUROSTOXXX50), but since value 
weighted returns were constructed, we miss the results of an equally weighted dataset. 
Therefore, due to the fact that the stock returns reacted after an announcement but not exactly 
as per expectation, hypothesis 1 partially holds.  
The 26-07-2012 event has gone down as a cornerstone event in the history of unconventional 
monetary policy announcements, with Mario Draghis speech in London, it could justify the 
counter intuitive surge on the event day. Since the event on 26-07-2012 was a speech carefully 
curated for the citizens of the EU discussing the power of unconventional monetary policies 
to secure a brighter future for the nation. The market response is best explained by a signalling 
effect since no particular monetary policy was discussed, although it was at the brink of the 
OMT program announcement, which was followed months later. The second hypothesis may 
shine some light into the reasons for this differences. In summary, an unconventional 
monetary policy announcement does not only affect future macro-economic conditions and 
consequently the medium to long term capital market, but also the immediate state of the 
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5.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 1 gave us an indication of the market expectation as a whole, however, the market 
index used for the analysis of the first hypothesis includes firms across the euro area that react 
differently in lieu of its geography. As established in the above section of the dissertation, 
pools of sub-economies within the EMU react differently to policy announcements, in the 
event of varying country risk rates amongst member states, hypothesis 2 breaks down the 
source of the equity returns generated within the EMU. 
The second hypothesis argues that a geographical bifurcation of the EU into firms within the 
Northern EMU and the Southern EMU, might show results that indicate a reaction within the 
stock markets that are different than one another. The argument backed by literature justifying 
this hypothesis is that of the European monetary policies focusing on narrowing intra-
Eurozone spreads and that macro-economic conditions and/or business cycles differ between 
the two regions. Both capital markets cannot move in the same direction, thereby causing 
dissonance within the member states. Tables 5 and 6 present the AARs and CAARs for the 
Northern states of the EMU, namely Germany and the Netherlands, while tables 7 and 8 
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Table 5, Northern EMU, AARs and CAARs three months estimation window using 
Wilcoxon-ranking test. 
 




































Table 6, Northern EMU, AARs and CAARs three months estimation window using 
Wilcoxon-ranking test. 
 





















Significance at 10%*, at 5%** and at 1%*** 
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Table 7, Southern EMU, AARs and CAARs three months estimation window using 
Wilcoxon-ranking test. 
 



































Table 8, Southern EMU, AARs and CAARs three months estimation window using 
Wilcoxon-ranking test. 
 

























 25  
These tables indicate a plethora of observations, amongst which one can notice that firms 
comprising the Southern members of the EMU react strikingly better than its northern 
counterparts with immediate impact on announcement day, on average. Consistent with 
previous research and our proposed assumption, differing movements can be observed in the 
regional analysis conducted. Before beginning a comprehensive summary of the analysis, to 
further finalize and verify our results of the second hypothesis, a two-sample t-test is 
conducted. This provides clearer evidence as to the differences in the abnormal returns post 
policy announcements, within the bifurcated regional samples used. As is common in the 
two-sample t-test the assumption that there is no correlation between the two sub-samples 
holds. As a consequence, the t-values might be underestimated. Table 9 and 10 provide the 
results of the two-sample t-test assuming the null hypothesis that the firms in the two sub-
samples do not react differently on the policy announcement. 
 
 
Table 9, two sample t-test north versus south (3 months estimation window, 99 degrees of 
freedom) 
 

























             Significance at 10%*, at 5%** and at 1%*** 
 
 




Table 10, two sample t-test north versus south (12 months estimation window, 99 degrees of 
freedom) 
 

















             Significance at 10%*, at 5%** and at 1%*** 
 
 
For event day (T0), all observations are significantly different from zero at the 5% level at the 
least, while for the day before or after the event it is marginally less consistent. The results 
largely fall in line with the expectations indicating a movement similar to changes in yields 
of respective economies, the northern EMU stock markets fell although the Euro area as a 
whole ended on a high. This was indicative of the fact that German 10-year yields rose to an 
average of 5%. The results indicate that northern and southern EMU move in line with the 
movement of the country specific yields. The southern EMU benefitted from most 
announcements, with the exception of event 2 (04-08-2011) which shows southern firms 
reacting in same direction to that of northern firms, one plausible explanation could be the 
Securities market program announced on the day had the ‘no bail out clause’. With the 
ongoing discord with Greece and its depleting economy, it might have driven money out of 
the stock market momentarily. However, these events occurred in the peak of the sovereign 
debt crisis and the effects were largely in line with issues associated with it. Fear of a debt-
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ridden economy in the future is also a bearish perspective to a sector of influential speculators 
that exist within financial intermediaries. 
 
This paradoxical movement could occur as a consequence of the primary agenda in the ECB 
to narrow intra euro zone spreads. This effect though seemingly reduces money supply within 
the stock markets of the northern firms, the result of such policies has been strengthening the 
weaker economies manifold. One could propose that the ECB deliberately announced 
policies with different effects for Northern and Southern markets focusing on intra-Eurozone 
variables. Another explanation for the difference is that the two regions have different macro-
economic conditions and business cycles and consequently react differently on an 
unconventional monetary policy. 
 
In a midst of these results, it would be interesting to conduct an industry wide analysis to 
further ascertain if contrasting results are not so much to do with geographical boundaries but 
more to do with the nature of each firm’s business. Unfortunately, unavailable data prohibits 
diving into an industry wide analysis, however, this paper conducts a third analysis wherein 
all European firms are divided into 6 portfolios categorized on a metric distributed through 
size and market capitalization. The goal is to spot a mild effect into the investor mindset, in 
capacity of the hypothesis, if smaller firms react differently to larger significant firms as a 
whole. This removes the geographical quotient and concentrates on general consensus of 
investor decision making during these unconventional monetary policy announcements. The 
data for this analysis has been sourced from the Kenneth French database. Table 11 and 12 
indicate the results of the analysis conducted with an estimation window of 12 months with 
the two events consistent throughout the analysis in this paper. The data is cleaned on 
STATA, with 2 metrics for the size and three metrics for the market capitalization. The 
Portfolios are divided into 6 groups, namely: (1) SMALLloINV, (2) SMALLmedINV, (3) 
SMALLhiINV, (4) BIGliINV, (5) BIGmedINV, (6) BIGhiINV. The SMALL and BIG 
denoting the size of the firms while the INV denotes the Market Capitalization of the firms 
divided into low, medium and high (lo, med, hi). These portfolios are made with a 2*3 matrix, 
of value weighted stocks wherein the 6 portfolios are divided into two sizes Small and Big, 
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and the investments by the firms are divided into 3 parts denoting the bottom 30%, middle 
40% and top 30%. 
 
Table 11, 6 portfolios through size and market Capitalization. (Using Wilcoxon test) 
 
 10-05-2010 -1 0 1 
SMALL-lo-INV -0.16%   -1.21% -0.84% 
 
SMALL-med-INV 0.10%   -1.46%** -0.49% 
SMALL-hi-INV 0.30% -2.31%*** 0.07% 
BIG-lo-INV 1.15%* -3.12%*** 0.10% 






  Table 12, 6 portfolios through size and market Capitalization. (Using Wilcoxon test) 
 
04-08-2011 -1 0 1 
SMALL-lo-INV 0.08% -1.93%*** -2.20%** 
 
SMALL-med-INV -0.32% -2.10%*** -2.32%** 
SMALL-hi-INV -0.72% -2.63%***   -3.14%***      
BIG-lo-INV 0.84% -0.83%     -0.38% 
BIG-med-INV 0.45% -1.54%**     -0.86% 
 
BIG-hi-INV 0.19% -1.85%***     -1.53% 
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Though not much can be claimed from this analysis, one can observe that on the day of the 
event (T0), most of the portfolio returns on T0 for the portfolios are negative and significant, 
it is to be noted that the portfolios were made up of firms situated largely in the Northern 
EMU region. The results suggest that unconventional policy announcement surprises have a 
weak significant influence on the portfolios and there is no clear pattern observed in the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimations. This result is in line with the portfolio wide analysis 
conducted in Haitsma et. al (2015), wherein a suitable connection between the results linking 





6. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
The objective of this paper has been to study the effect that an unconventional monetary 
policy announcement has on equity stock returns, consequently, test the effect on two sub 
sets of firms categorised on its geography (Northern and Southern firms within the Economic 
and Monetary Union of Europe). For the purpose of this analysis, an event study methodology 
had been constructed with assistance from a combination of previous research and literature, 
and subsequently put to test, which resulted in an output justifying the first hypothesis. 
Proceeding with the first result that was in consistency with several other papers including 
those of Haitsma et al. (2016) and Rigobon and Sack (2004), this dissertation further tests for 
the second finding to ascertain a differential relationship between northern and southern firms 
within the European market. The first finding dictates that unconventional monetary policy 
announcements effects have an immediate effect on stock markets through the transmission 
of the signalling and valuation channel. The second finding dictates that the working of these 
unconventional monetary policies works in a manner as to assert different effects for different 
sub-economies within the union. It is backed up by the fact that the ECB policy contributed 
to reduce intra euro spreads, which have different effects on the northern and southern 
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economy respectively. However, these effects can also be contributed to differences in 
financial and macro-economic conditions.  
 
Expansionary policies almost always tend to drive asset prices upwards including equities. 
We have no reason to believe otherwise and test for the effect of unconventional expansionary 
monetary policies on equity prices. The major observation leads to believe that stock markets 
react almost immediately to policy announcements, however, some policies pushed down 
equity markets on the day of the announcement, but eventually corrected themselves to 
market averages. In relation to yields, from 2012-2015 as and when falling German yields 
resulted in selloffs, the increased supply reduced prices and pushed yields back up again in 
this cycle. Thus, one cannot conclude with certainty if the total effect of these policies were 
detrimental to European stock markets, irrespective of the fact that the northern EMU region 
had reacted negatively on the day of most policy announcements. 
 
In modern day, German equity markets have hit record highs while Italian 10-year yields are 
touching record lows, showing that unconventional monetary policies have done a good job 
in stabilising government yields as in their agenda. Another interesting aspect is that with 
German bunds falling below the zero level for a long time now, the demand for German bonds 
have not decreased but have increased as a matter of fact. Intuitively, as long as their reserves 
increase, the demand for German bonds will not decrease, the falling Euro helped Germany 
to increase exports globally, thereby powering this negative yield state to function with 
harmony so far. Therefore, plummeting yields can only bring about shocks of downfalls but 
will tend to hit mean levels in the following days. Another observation that can be made is 
all markets ended positively on a 5-day CAAR analysis, which reinstates the positive effect 
of unconventional monetary policy announcements on stock markets. 
 
One could argue that the results achieved might come with its own set of biases. It is argued 
by Rigobon and Sack (2004) that the used event study methodology is not appropriate for this 
kind of research, as the assumptions made regarding the event window are too strong. The 
presence of Macro-economic along with indirect global movements tend to smudge such 
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shocks. There exist several indirect implications of the various financial instruments traded 
in and out of Europe. Thus, conducting an event study might not be the most appropriate tool 
to analyse such a subject, and could be seen as a limitation for this dissertation. However, the 
criticism of Rigobon and Sack (2004) is on using monetary policy as the event and not the 
announcement of such policy. Another possible limitation is that this dissertation does not go 
into the depth of the different kinds of Unconventional Policy programs that have been 
launched. Several little clauses could have played a role in the market movements, since high 
volume investors including financial intermediaries like hedge funds and AMCs carefully 
analyse these programs to extract the forecasted implications of such measures.  
Consequently, the discovered relationship between the announcements and stock returns 
could be for a specific kind of unconventional monetary policy. This is especially worrying 
as only two different kind of announcements were used. However, including more events 
through a more sound methodology of controlling the announcement effects of one or more 
policies in the estimation window in future research might rectify for this limitation, such that 
individual effects are of less influence on the overall conclusions/results. An industry wide 
research could be conducted in order to see the implications of these unconventional 
monetary policy announcements on different firms with respect to the nature of their business, 
thereby trying to establish a credit channel linked to such announcements.  
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  Table 2, descriptive statistics, and 1-year estimation window all securities combined 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 
Mean 0,10% -,02% 
Median 0,04% 0,00% 
Minimum -18,00% -23,69% 
Maximum 24,59% 13,50% 
Jacques-Bera 2821,10 143,14 
Number of observations 36432 36570 
Number of observations per 
security 
264 265 






Table 3, descriptive statistics, and 3-months estimation window all securities combined 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean 0,07% -0,31% -0,02% 
Median 0,00% -0,23% 0,00% 
Minimum -14,28% -18,88% -16.63% 
Maximum 24,59% 12,19% 19,88% 
Jacques-Bera 4098,18 361,99 250,06 
Number of observations 9384 9384 9246 
Number of observations per security 68 68 67 
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     Table 4, descriptive statics, and 1-month estimation window all securities combined 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 6-10-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean -0,20% -0,69% -0,05% 0,09% 
Median -0,31% -0,55% -0,09% 0,10% 
Minimum -14,28% -18,88% -12,35% -11,49% 
Maximum 24,59% 9,98% 16,89% 19,88% 
Jacques-Bera 2545,99 89,93 30,93 143,05 
Number of observations 3588 3588 3588 3588 
Number of observations per 
security 
26 26 26 26 






Table 5, descriptive statistics, 1-year estimation window northern securities 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 
Mean 0,15% 0,00% 
Median 0,06% 0,00% 
Minimum -18,00% -23,69% 
Maximum 24,59% 10,14% 
Jacques-Bera 1013,37 286,69 
Number of observations 13200 13250 
Number of observations per 
security 
264 265 
Number of securities/firms 50 50 
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Table 6, descriptive statistics, 3-months estimation window northern securities 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean 0,00% -0,25% -0,04% 
Median 0,08% -0,16% -0,01% 
Minimum -9,07% -10,80% -11,47% 
Maximum 24,59% 8,79 % 17,02% 
Jacques-Bera 563,97 126,87 50,15 
Number of observations 3400 3400 3350 
Number of observations per 
security 
68 68 67 





Table 7, descriptive statistics, 1-month estimation window northern securities 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 6-10-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean 0,00% -0,58% -0,04% 0,25% 
Median -0,16% -0,42% -0,16% 0,25% 
Minimum -8,30% -10,80% -11,22% -11,47% 
Maximum 24,59% 8,79% 14,50 % 9,30% 
Jacques-Bera 501,00 61,17 8,29 0,90 
Number of observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Number of observations 
per security 
26 26 26 26 
Number of securities/firms 50 50 50 50 
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        Table 8, descriptive statistics, 1-year estimation window southern securities 
  
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 
Mean 0,00% -0,07% 
Median 0,00% -0,03% 
Minimum -13,41% -17,36% 
Maximum 23,22% 12,19% 
Jacques-Bera 1429,60 0,03 
Number of observations 13464 13515 
Number of observations per 
security 
264 265 





Table 9, descriptive statistics, 3-months estimation window southern securities 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean 0,00% -0,39% -0,10% 
Median 0,00% -0,30% -0,03% 
Minimum -11,62% -17,36% -11,35% 
Maximum 23,22% 12,19% 19,88% 
Jacques-Bera 2224,50 23,35 166,64 
Number of observations 3468 3468 3417 
Number of observations per 
security 
68 68 67 





       Table 10, descriptive statistics, 1-month estimation window southern securities 
 
 
event date 10-05-2010 04-08-2011 6-10-2011 26-07-2012 
Mean 0,00% -0,75% -0,05% -0,09% 
Median -0,47% -0,66% 0,11% -0,06% 
Minimum -8,41% –17,36% -10,91% -9,34% 
Maximum 23,22% 9,98% 16,89 % 19,88% 
Jacques-Bera 1121,22 1,95 4,08 105,01 
Number of observations 1326 1326 1326 1326 
Number of observations per 
security 
26 26 26 26 
Number of securities/firms 51 51 51 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
